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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Carlos enr ue Consal i no n as Santia o and a nati e o

ene uela

founded the clandestine Radio Venceremos, which broadcasted throughout the
thirteen-year Salvadoran civil war from 1980 through 1992. The station represented the
only oppositional voice to the repressive military-ruled government of El Salvador, and
Santiago was among the first members of the media to broadcast reports of the
massacre at El Mozote.
He noted in his memoir that the unmistakable stench of death shrouded the
village upon his arrival on December 30, 1981. The deserted plaza of El Mozote was in
complete disorder. Benches ripped apart, walls littered with bullets holes, and
scattered about the ground were bodies, identification cards, shoes, dolls, baby bottles,
and remnants of clothing. Santiago toured the ruined town noting that the perpetrators
burned the majority of the dwellings. He also found hundreds of 5.56 caliber shell
casings littering the area and noticed among the charred bones and rubble an
ammunition boxed mar ed “NATO.”1
The Salvadoran army repeated such horrific acts in nine different villages in the
area of El Mozote during the same operation. A charcoal inscription scrawled on a table
in the pla a ser ed as a arnin to others: “The Atlacatl as here. The daddy o
sub ersi es. . . . This is here these sons o bitches met their ate and i you still ha en’t
ot the balls just as us or them. We’re hell’s an els and e’ll be bac . We ant to
inish o the rest o you.”2
The massacre at El Mozote and surrounding villages in December 1981 was a
gruesome reminder of the depths of American foreign policy and the limits of the
Salvadoran imagination. Backed by a landed oligarchy composed primarily of coffee
farmers and agro-industrialists, for fifty years from the 1930s until the 1980s, a nearly
unbroken chain of military despots ruled the country. The massacre was but one

1

Carlos Henriquez Consalvi, Broadcasting the Civil War in El Salvador: A Memoir of Guerrilla Radio,
trans. Charles Leo Nagle and A. L. Prince (Austin: University Of Texas Press, 2010), 82.
2
Ibid., 82-3.
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episode of thousands where the military, in service of the oligarchy and the status quo,
quashed dissent, whether apparent or implied.3
In 1932 an e ent no n as “La Mantanza” propelled the military to the
position of institutional and political dominance in El Salvador.4 It was then that a
former member of the oligarchy, Farabundo Marti, launched an armed communist
uprising which General Maximiliano Hernández Martínez brutally suppressed using the
military. The suppression of the revolt was effectively genocide, killing approximately
twenty to forty thousand campesinos and civilians, the majority of which were of
indigenous descent.5 The legacy bequeathed to the military was one that championed
wanton repression and the goal was to silence all opposition to the security forces and
their policies.6
American aid to El Sal ador as minimal throu hout much o the military’s
fifty-year reign of terror. Outside of economic aid, the United States placed little
importance on the small Central American country prior to the late 1970s. It was after
the Sandinista revolution in nearby Nicaragua in 1979 that American commanders and
personnel started to fear the spread of communism into other parts of the region. In
addition rumblin s o a “re ormist coup” in ol in youn Sal adoran o icers
reverberated through Washington. Reportedly, these officers planned to end military
repression and promote social and political reform.7
On October 15, 1979, a bloodless coup ousted former President Carlos
Humberto Romero, replacing him with a revolutionary ruling junta composed of both
3

Brian J. Bosch, The Salvadoran Officer Corps and the Final Offensive of 1981 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland
&, 1999), xi.
4
Literally, the massacre.
5
Thomas P. Anderson, Matanza; El Salvador's Communist Revolt of 1932 (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1971), 131-4, 138, 144-5; Bosch, 7.
6
In a December 27, 1982, interview with reporter Raymond Bonner of the New York Times, Jose
Napoleon Duarte was asked why he thought the rebels were fighting in El Salvador and replies: "Fifty
years of lies, fifty years of injustice, [and] fifty years of frustration. This is a history of people starving to
death, living in misery. For fifty years the same people had all the power, all the money, all the jobs, all the
education, [and] all the opportunities." Raymond Bonner, Weakness and Deceit: U.S. Policy and El
Salvador (New York: Times Books, 1984), 24.
7
Dermot Keogh, "The Myth of the Liberal Coup: The United States and the 15 October 1979 Coup in El
Salvador," Journal of International Studies 13, no. 2 (June 1984): 153-4.
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military commanders and civilians. The junta released ambitious proposals including
land, banking, and electoral reforms, and the Americans used this as an opportunity to
reinstitute funding of the military. U.S. policy personnel viewed the overthrow of
Romero as a radical break from the past when, in reality, the opposite was the case.
Rather than establishing a basis for reform and diminishing the grip of the Salvadoran
military on the political process, the appropriation of huge American subsidies,
according to scholar Dermot Keogh, created a new, independent military class. 8
This new class was no longer dependent on the oligarchy for capital because
American dollars provided a seemingly endless substitute, and prolonging the war
became an economic necessity. The greed, corruption, and ineptitude of the Salvadoran
military only increased with American funding. A Salvadoran priest who worked for the
Inter-American Bank during the 1980s estimated that at least half of all American aid to
El Salvador ended up in private, offshore bank accounts.9
The civil war in El Salvador emerged late in the 1970s amid the smoldering
ashes of Vietnam, which, combined with the embassy standoff in Tehran, the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan, and the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua, made for an
apprehensive period in American foreign policy. Even so, why did American policymakers care so much about El Salvador? The answer was communism, and the
campesinos of El Sal ador ould pay or Nicara ua’s ties to both Mosco and a ana.
Salvadoran state terror was among the most severe in the Western
Hemisphere during this period. Roughly 1 percent of the population was murdered and
untold thousands “disappeared.” The i ure does not su est the ull impact o the
violence since the killings were concentrated predominantly among young men and
campesinos, increasing the likelihood that nearly every poor Salvadoran family
experienced a political killing or at least knew of someone who had.10

8

Ibid., 177-8.
Keogh interview with Fray Jose Alas, Cork, May 1984, Keogh, 178.
10
William Deane Stanley, The Protection Racket State: Elite Politics, Military Extortion, and Civil War in
El Salvador (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1996), 3.
9
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American policy toward El Salvador during the early 1980s consisted of large
aid packages designed to bolster the ruling junta and the security apparatus that policed
the country. From 1980 to 1982, the Carter and Reagan administrations poured into El
Salvador more military aid than in the previous history of relations between the two
countries.11 Neither the Carter nor the Reagan administration wanted to commit U.S.
troops to the region, but both feared the encroachment of leftist influences in El
Salvador.
Few Americans realize that their government poured billions of dollars into the
economy and military of El Salvador throughout the late 1970s and 1980s. Even fewer
remember the massacre at El Mozote and the American involvement in its execution
and cover-up. The story of the late 1981 massacre in the village of El Mozote by the
elite American-trained Atlacatl Battalion served as a frightening reminder of the
duplicitous nature of U.S. policy.12 The specter of communist Cuba and the ubiquitous
threat of the Soviet Union made El Salvador, at least in the minds of those in the State
Department, a proxy battleground for the fight against the forces of communism, and
policies that focused on human rights receded. Murder became the only means of
political expression in El Salvador.13

11

In Beverly’s informative account, he related how in April 1980 Carter authorized $5.7 million in military
aid, which ceased in December due to the assassination of American religious personnel. However, in fear
of the rebels’ encroachment, Carter resumed the aid in January 1981 with an additional $10 million. This
policy continued under Reagan, although to a larger degree. Shortly after taking office, Reagan authorized,
without congressional approval, $20 million in “lethal” aid and an additional $5 million subject to
subsequent Congressional approval. John Beverley, "El Salvador," Social Text, no. 5 (Spring 1982): 67-72.
12
The Atlacatl Battalion was an elite counterinsurgency strike force molded and financed by American aid
and training. American advisors formed and trained the Atlacatl Battalion in El Salvador in 1981. A
number of Salvadoran Officers and NCOs trained at the School of the Americas at Ft. Benning, Georgia,
and some of them served in the Atlacatl Battalion at some point during their careers, but the members who
took part in El Mozote trained in Panama and in El Salvador. Memorandum, Antonio J. Ramos to
Chairman of Joint Chiefs, Congressional Inquiry Regarding U.S. training of the Atlacatl Battalion, 25 June
1993, EL00611, El Salvador: The Making of U.S. Policy, 1977-1984 (hereafter EL within document
number), Digital National Security Archive, http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com (hereafter DNSA), 1.
13
Richard L. Millett, "The Politics of Violence: Guatemala and El Salvador," Current History 80 (1981):
70.
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The human rights group Americas Watch compiled a report on the massacre,
re errin to it as one o the most “e re ious o the entire con lict.”14 It described the
incident as the “cold-blooded murder of hundreds of civilians in northern Morazán by
Sal adoran troops o the U.S. trained Atlacatl Battalion.”15 U.S. policy makers ignored
human ri hts atrocities committed by Sal adoran troops and this denial “re lected a
structural flaw in [American] policy.” President Ronald Rea an determined that
equipping and funding the Salvadoran armed forces and encouraging elections could
defeat the communist subversives both militarily and politically. This meant that the
preservation of the Salvadoran government became vital to American security, and
admitting human rights abuses would compromise U.S. and international support for
the Salvadoran government.16 Thus the Rea an administration had an “incenti e to
downplay, distort, [and] deny the human ri hts record o the Sal adoran Army.”17
Americas Watch was not the only group that monitored the behavior of the
Salvadoran troops, especially as it pertained to human rights. Amnesty International
compiled a report on the condition of human rights in El Salvador for 1981, and its
findings varied little from those of Americas Watch. The Salvadoran government
“encoura e[d] and allo [ed] pri ate persons and roups to commit acts hich
constitute[d] abuses o human ri hts.”18 Methods o torture included “electric shock,

14

Americas Watch Committee, The Massacre at El Mozote: The Need to Remember (New York: Americas
Watch, 1992), 7-9.
15
Ibid., 3.
16
In a memo written February 4, 1982, to Assistant Secretary Elliott Abrams, the State Human Rights
Bureau called the recently issued ACLU-Americas Watch human rights report, “An extremely well
prepared effective documentation of the human rights violations in El Salvador by government forces. Its
moderate and clinical tone contributed to its effectiveness and credibility. The report’s careful preparation
and general tendency to stick to either what is credible or what cannot be effectively disproved make it a
tough document to attack . . . However well done, the report is still fruit from a poisoned tree.” Report,
State Department, Dale Shaffer to Elliot Abrams, The ACLU-Americas Watch Committee on Human Rights
in El Salvador: A Preliminary Analysis, 4 February 1982, ES02548, El Salvador: War, Peace, and Human
Rights, 1980–1994 (hereafter ES within document number), DNSA, 1-18.
17
Americas Watch, 4.
18
Amnesty International, Current Assessment of the Human Rights Situation in El Salvador, January 1982,
ES0248, DNSA, 2.
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beatings, the use of sulfuric acid resulting in scorched flesh on portions of the body and
the use o hallucino enic dru s.”19
The forcefulness of the reports of both Amnesty International and Americas
Watch make it apparent that the American foreign policy intelligentsia downplayed and,
in some cases, lied about human rights atrocities in El Salvador. At a certain point, by
giving aid to the Salvadoran authorities who used it to violate basic human rights, the
U.S. State Department became complicit in their actions. Significant U.S. investment in
the Salvadoran military did not have the intended effect. Instead of curbing excesses on
the part of security forces, the military used American funding to perpetuate the
existing civil war in El Salvador.
Rather than observing that the problem was of a political nature with historical
roots, the U.S. government did all it could to keep a favorable rightist regime in power.
The regime feigned good relations with the U.S.; they relied on the belief that existed in
Washington that the Salvadoran government could not win without American support.
Certainly, the leftist regime that appeared poised to replace it would not be as
welcoming. Thus, El Salvador became the recipient of the largest U.S. military aid
program ever granted to a Latin American country to that time.
In order to highlight the complicity of the American government, this thesis will
discuss in depth the most important massacre perpetrated by the Salvadoran military.
While the American government maintained publicly that respect for human rights was
one of the main goals of its mission in El Salvador, six billion dollars of aid and American
actions in the region belied another reality. This examination argues that it is clear that
the massacre at El Mozote in late 1981 was the direct result of U.S. foreign policy
initiatives. Although the Americans kept themselves insulated to provide for plausible
deniability, the policies of the Carter and Reagan administrations institutionalized the
murder of civilians as a necessary element of American foreign policy in El Salvador.

19

Ibid.,1; Mark Danner, The Massacre at El Mozote: A Parable of the Cold War (New York: Vintage
Books, 1994), 158.
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CHAPTER 2: HISTORIOGRAPHICAL REVIEW
The historiography of the civil war in El Salvador and American involvement in
it is replete with writings that advocate a particular political stance or ideology. Human
rights organizations and other humanitarian agencies provided glimpses of the conflict
augmented by neatly proportioned tables of murder statistics and their purported
transgressors. Since the intent was to draw attention to the violations, aid organizations
tended to ocus on the “ ictims” only in so ar as they represented a broader theme o
repression and state violence. These works made little mention of the personal
histories of the victims and often substituted numbers for names.
Conversely, writers with right-leaning political ideals have produced volumes
that blasted the media and the former aid organizations for fostering the notion of
repression where one did not actually exist. In these works, the authors eulogize the
American administration while criticizing the work of its opponents. They attribute the
shortcomings of American policy in El Salvador to the incompetency of Salvadoran
military and government officials, while ignoring the myopia of those within the
American administration.
Although both of the aforementioned types of sources have limitations, the
conclusions they make are not meaningless when combined with other material. These
historiographical divisions highlight the polarity of the conflict and signal its political
importance. Rather than summarizing each respective area of scholarship, this
examination endeavors to highlight some of the major contributions from each,
beginning with those from the left. Scholar Donald Porpora and his work on American
policy in Central America exemplify this first group.
Porpora ar ues or a de inition o

enocide that ac no led es “the ill ul

destruction o ci ilians on political rounds.” I the de inition expanded to co er
political illin s then in Guatemala El Sal ador and Nicara ua the United States “ as
indeed sponsorin

enocide.”20 In his estimation, the United States was intent on

20

Douglas V. Porpora, How Holocausts Happen: The United States in Central America (Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 1990), 132-3.
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destroying the peoplehood of El Salvador using proxies like the Salvadoran military.
With the massacre at El Mo ote as a prime example he “sees no reason to not use the
word that seem[ed] to fit . . . and admit that we, the people of the United States,
became a party to just hat it seem[ed]: Genocide.”21
The best embodiment of the rightist interpretation of the American role in El
Salvador was the work of four lieutenant colonels from the U.S. Army. Each served as a
National Security Fellow at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University
during the 1987-88 academic year, and together composed an analysis of U.S. military
policy in small wars. They argue that once having decided to use force to gain its ends,
the United States needed to abandon “business as usual” and commit itsel to innin .
Accordin to them “The importance o commitment oes beyond morality.”22 This
mentality was certainly not lost on the Salvadorans, but the multi-faceted goals of
American policy made it a tough stance for the administration to advocate publicly in
the face of massacres like that of El Mozote.
In addition, academics like Lars Schoultz and William Deane Stanley probed
motivations for American policy in the region. Schoultz argues that the Americans
pursued a bifurcated policy in El Salvador. This policy included a Food for Peace
program to feed the hungry and destitute, and a military assistance program to stop the
advance of communism. This curious bi-polarity made for a confusing policy, which
aimed to eliminate guerillas, while simultaneously feeding the poor.
According to Schoult “[The] United States regularly filled two trucks, one with
Food for Peace shipments . . . and the other with U.S. armed and trained Salvadoran
soldiers to attac the communist uerillas.”23 It was impossible to tell rebel from
campesino, and at the village level, the Salvadoran military decided who got which. US
policy glossed over the difficulty of this decision by assuming that someone could

21

Ibid., 135.
Andrew J. Bacevich et al., American Military Policy in Small Wars: The Case of El
Salvador (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988), 50.
23
Lars Schoultz, Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1998), 358-9.
22
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separate the instability caused by rising expectations among the hungry poor from the
instability caused by communist adventurism. Before the recognition of this flaw, eighty
thousand Salvadorans would be dead.24
While Schoultz focuses on American policy, Stanley studies the government in
El Salvador. According to him, the Salvadoran military state was a protection racket.
The military earned the concession to govern the country in exchange for its willingness
to use iolence a ainst class enemies o the country’s relati ely small but po er ul
economic elite. Again, El Mozote provided a cogent example of the lengths to which the
Salvadoran authorities would go to ensure the continuation of the status quo. Stanley
argues that state violence was the currency of relations between state and non-state
elites in El Salvador.25

24
25

Ibid., 359.
Stanley, 6-7.
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CHAPTER 3: CORRUPTION IN EL SALVADOR
In order to determine American culpability in regards to the massacre at El
Mozote and the killing of non-combatants in El Salvador during the late 1970s and
1980s, we must examine the American economic and military policies towards El
Salvador before the massacre of December 1981. In doing so, we will closely follow the
progression of a foreign policy that accepted as necessary the slaughter of innocent
citizens. It will be clear that El Mozote was not an isolated incident perpetrated by a
small percentage of rogue military commanders; rather it was the culmination of a
concerted program of domestic terror by a corrupt military fostered and encouraged by
American foreign policy in an attempt to thwart the advance of communism.
Between 1957 and 1979, the US trained 448 Salvadoran police, and US
assistance for grants, credits, and training totaled $16.7 million between 1950 and 1979.
This included $7.4 million for the military assistance program and $2.1 million for police
training.26 Demographically, by 1980, El Salvador had the highest proportion of landless
families in all of Latin America, a proportion only matched in prerevolutionary Cuba. In
1980 El Salvador had a higher population density than India, with about 580 people per
square mile and the latter with 550. Farming operated on approximately 1.5 million
hectares of land in El Salvador, and fewer than two thousand families, representing onefifth of 1 percent of the overall population, owned over 60 percent.27
In addition to the extreme concentration of land in the hands of a wealthy few,
the Salvadoran military operated in very different ways than its American counterpart.
Although their tactical training certainly lagged behind that of the Americans, more
importantly, the Salvadorans differed on a philosophical level. Prospective officers did

26

Michael McClintock, The American Connection (London: Zed Books, 1985), 178; Lars Schoultz, Human
Rights and United States Policy Toward Latin America (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981),
215; Leigh Binford, The El Mozote Massacre: Anthropology and Human Rights (Tucson: University of
Arizona Press, 1996), 39.
27
Ibid., 232, 261; Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of
Representatives, U.S. Policy Toward El Salvador : Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Inter-American
Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 97.Congress, 1.Session, March 5
and 11, 1981 (Washington: U.S. GPO, 1981), 232.
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not enroll in the academy to root out communist subversives; instead, they joined to
enrich themselves and their families.28
Fundamental differences in military philosophy included a disen a ed o icers’
corps

hich ostered hat American trainers called a “ arrison mentality.” Rather than

actively pursuing the rebels, Salvadoran commanders preferred to engage with massive
force only during the day. American advisors continually commented on the need to
o ercome this “nine-to-five, five-day-a- ee ” arrison-bound ideology. The Americans
encouraged unconventional tactics like night raids and psychological warfare but to no
avail.29
The Salvadoran army forced into service peasant conscripts who possessed
little will to fight, and the bulk of the government forces were as destitute as the rebels
they were fighting.30 The highly motivated rebel resistance exposed the Salvadoran
commanders’ excessive reliance on firepower, and their unwillingness to take the fight
to the rebels.31 As in Vietnam, the Salvadorans welcomed American assistance, but
spurned American military advice. The advice, which advocated radical reforms,
threatened to undermine the position of those in power roles in the Salvadoran
military.32
In the Salvadoran military system, graduates of the military academy formed
associations called tandas. The tanda would receive group-based promotions, meaning
it was predetermined that every commissioned Salvadoran officer would become
colonel regardless of his own incompetence, lack of bravery, or corruptness. This
system rewarded indolence and failed to promote or reward commendable

28

Bosch, 14.
Max G. Manwaring and Court Prisk, El Salvador at War: An Oral History (Washington, DC: National
Defense University Press, 1988), 111-6; Andrew J. Bacevich et al., 5-6.
30
Max G. Manwaring and Court Prisk, 28-9.
31
Benjamin C. Schwarz, American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador: The Frustrations of
Reform and the Illusions of Nation Building (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1991), vi.
32
Schwarz, viii; Bosch, 14-5.
29
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performance, and after each member of the tanda completed their thirty years of
service, they would pass into honorable retirement.33
U.S. military advisors undertook the reorganization of the Salvadoran military
command structure. This reorganization implied challenging the entrenched tanda
system, which not only meant curtailing the excesses of the tanda currently holding
power, but also mollifying the ambitions of upcoming tandas. The hesitancy of the
oligarchy to permit the army ownership of the means of production limited them to
other disreputable activities. Thus, when a tanda reached the zenith of military power it
was a most opportune time for its officers to increase their personal wealth and
status.34 Overhauling a system that provided, in the words of one long-time observer,
“no incenti e to excel – none hatsoe er ” as a major roadblock to American success
in El Salvador.35
Salvadoran officers claimed a privileged status incongruent with the status of
commissioned officers in the American military. Rather than inculcating in the soldiers a
commitment to strategic mastery or a sense of responsibility for the performance of
their units on the contrary the o icer’s corps under alued leadership en enderin a
dangerously cavalier attitude towards combat operations, and did little to improve the
non-commissioned soldier’s lot.36 American trainers focused on the younger
generations of Salvadoran officers, trying to break the hold of the tanda system. As
opposed to creating a core of competent models for the military at large, it served to
exacerbate tensions bet een the “ rin o” o icers and the traditionalists. This policy
forced the younger officers to choose between being ostracized by the older corps or
giving in to the demands of adherence to Salvadoran military traditions.37

33

Bosch, 4; Richard Duncan Downie, Learning From Conflict: The U.S. Military in Vietnam, El Salvador,
and the Drug War (Westport: Praeger, 1998), 135.
34
Mario Lungo and Arthur Schmidt, El Salvador in the Eighties: Counterinsurgency and
Revolution (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1996), 71; Schwarz, 18-9.
35
Bacevich, 25.
36
Ibid., 26, Schwarz, 19..
37
Bosch, 5; Max G. Manwaring and Court Prisk, 27.
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Colonel John D. Waghelstein, commander of the U.S. Military Group in El
Sal ador rom 1982 to 1983 o ered his analysis on the military and o ernment. “The
Salvadoran system was not designed to solve the problems of the campesino dating
bac i ty years ” he said “or e en lon er i you o bac be ore the Matan a.” Those in
po er desi ned the o ernment to maintain order and i the “campesino didn’t li e it
[you] had a couple of options: you could emigrate or you could become part of the
ertili er pro ram.” No mechanism existed or the expression o

rie ances; “you ere

at the mercy o the lando ner and the military in cahoots.”38
Salvadoran military commanders thwarted American goals because of their
cupidity, and fought jealously for their financial prerogatives. Every year Salvadoran
regional commanders personally received the pay allotments for the soldiers under their
command. Because the armed forces lacked proper oversight and did not keep accurate
records, most commanders would fill a sizable portion of these spots with fictitious
soldiers. The commanders collected the salaries o these “ host soldiers ” and most
brigades had at least one fifty-man “Ghost Company.” Since the salary or a re-enlistee
was nearly double that of a conscript, a “ host” re-enlistee was quite profitable to an
individual commander. Thus, many commanders discouraged re-enlistees because it
in rin ed upon their “ host” salary pro its. E en thou h American ad isors thou ht it
was critical to create a corps of non-commissioned officers, the individual greed of the
entrenched Salvadoran commanders made it nearly impossible.39
Salvadoran military avarice was institutional as well as personal. Every soldier
paid a portion of his salary, matched by the government, to a special armed forces social
security fund. The Instituto de Prevision Social de la Fuerza Armada, or IPSFA, was the
military’s social el are pro ram and it allo ed the Sal adoran military to become the
most powerful economic and social institution in the country. As the largest source of
liquid capital in El Salvador at the time, the armed forces used this fund as their own

38

Manwaring and Prisk, 8; Bosch, 14-5.
Schwarz, 19; Joel Millman, "SALVADOR: 'We Have Been Acquiescing for Years in Corruption,' Says a
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commercial bank and invested heavily in myriad business ventures. Benefits were not
available to conscripts although every soldier paid into the fund. Only injured conscripts
and the relatives of dead soldiers received any payments. The only elements of the
Salvadoran armed forces that were eligible for benefits were officers and a small
number of re-enlistees. Officers enjoyed the overwhelming majority of the benefits and
subsidies of the program, and it was necessary to ensure that the non-drawing members
of the fund remained as large as possible. Certainly, a large corps of non-commissioned
officers would shrink the available funds, which was yet another example of how the
Salvadoran officers, because of greed, denied themselves an essential tool in the fight
against the insurgency.40
The greed and corruption of the officers of the Salvadoran armed forces
included selling goods at inflated prices to their subordinates, embezzling cash from
supply funds, and even leasing soldiers under their command as guards and laborers to
landowners and businessmen for security. Many times, the officers sacrificed what was
good for the war effort for what was better for their bottom lines.41 Leaders of the
resistance in El Salvador admitted in 1984 that they procured 10 to 15 percent of their
weapons and ammunition on the black market from high-ranking Salvadoran
commanders. In addition to high-ranking corruption, individual rebels reportedly
bought bullets for the equivalent on one dollar each from government soldiers. Thus, a
large quantity of material meant for the Salvadoran forces ended up in the hands of the
guerillas mainly due to corruption.42
Since 1984, the United States maintained a training center in La Union to
instruct Salvadoran recruits. Rather than encourage their troops to attend, the
commanders did the opposite. Training at this American center entailed the release of
the troops rom the commandin o icer’s care

hich also meant that the Salvadoran

officers relinquished the control of the funds intended to provide for the recruits.
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Preferring not to lose this flow of income, many of the Salvadoran commanders elected
to train their soldiers themselves. Again, the officers concern presided with their
pecuniary interests rather than the training of their men.43 The systemic corruption of
the military also thwarted human rights investigations because many of the officers had
intimate knowledge of the seedy actions of other commanders and used this
information to blackmail the occasional officer who cooperated with authorities during
investigations of alleged human rights excesses.44
Not surprisingly, corruption was an inherent aspect of the Salvadoran political
system as well during the years of military rule, and the U.S. acknowledged that it
continued throughout the government of Napoleon Duarte. Duarte was the founder of
the Christian Democratic Party in El Salvador, and the American-backed candidate for
president in 1984.45 Duarte provided a democratic façade for the military, but American
foreign policy officials argued that the level of corruption in the Salvadoran military and
political systems was no different from those prevalent in other third world countries.
The perception was that Duarte, himself, was not corrupt, but many accused him of
tolerating corruption among his closest officials. According to multiple press reports,
corruption was widespread in El Salvador, and some concluded that corruption
increased during the presidency of Duarte.46
Journalist James LeMoyne accused a close associate o President Duarte’s son
Guillermo Antonio Gue ara Lacayo

ho as at the time one o Duarte’s chie aides o

building a multi-million dollar mansion while making an annual salary of $24,000.
Accordin to LeMoyne Lacayo as “not apolo etic; a ter all many other o ernment
43
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o icials and army o icers ha e ne

arms ne Mercedes Ben es ne restaurants.” In

February 1989, the New York Times reported that the U.S. Embassy in El Salvador had
started nearly one hundred different audits to trace the uses of American aid. 47
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CHAPTER 4: AMERICAN AID TO EL SALVADOR
Since the American policy-makers never explicitly, either in a document or in a
speech, advocated the wholesale slaughter of innocent civilians in El Salvador, we must
explore other avenues to illuminate American collusion. One particularly fruitful
approach is through an examination of American military and economic aid to the
government of El Salvador. Beginning in 1979, American support for the Salvadoran
government grew exponentially, and not coincidentally, the first four years of the war
were, in fact, the bloodiest for civilians. Because of traditionalist, reformist, and
revolutionary roups pressin their mutually exclusi e a endas El Sal ador’s economy
was under great strain just before and during the war. 48
Between 1979 and 1983, the Salvadoran real GDP shrank by 25 percent after
experiencing 5 percent annual growth during the 1970s. This was attendant with a drop
in employment and exports, a 75 percent drop in private investment and increased
capital flight.49 Based in part on the American response to the “re ormist” coup o
October 1979, U.S. aid to El Salvador, economic and military, increased markedly, and
with the fiscal year 1981 aid program, the Carter administration set the pattern for
subsequent disbursements of aid. That is, rapidly increasing amounts of military and
economic aid accompanied with relatively stable amounts of developmental aid.
Reagan continued this pattern through the early years of his administration, and from
fiscal years 1981 through 1984 U.S. aid to El Salvador saw an eight-fold increase.50
The Military Assistance Program (MAP), the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credit
program, and the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program were
the three main components of American military aid in Central America during the late
1970s and early 1980s. MAP supplied, on a grant basis, military equipment including
weapons, ammunition, vehicles, and aircraft, while the FMS credit program provided for
similar transfers on a commercial-rate, and, in some cases, concessional, loan basis.
48
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FMS became the most popular conduit for military aid to Central America because it
allowed the U.S. and the recipient country to avoid exposure to congressional oversight
inherent with the MAP program. IMET offered training to military personnel from
developing countries, which occurred at numerous American bases throughout the
region and in recipient countries.51
From 1978 to 1980, American military aid focused on equipment, including
vehicles and communication technology. From 1981 to 1984, these shipments
continued ith the addition o other military “consumables” such as small arms
ammunition, training, and field equipment. At the same time, IMET began emphasizing
counterinsurgency skills rather than professionalization and general military skills. In
fiscal year 1979, the U.S. sent only $7,000 through MAP to El Salvador, and no IMET
funds or FMS credits.52
Fiscal year 1980 saw a rapid growth in the amount and distribution of military
aid. This included $338,000 in IMET grants, $11,000 in MAP funds, and $7.8 million in
FMS credits. In addition, $80.6 million in economic and developmental aid accompanied
the $8.1 million dollars of military aid in 1980, and the military aid represented 9
percent of the overall aid package to El Salvador. This was double the percentage of
military aid provided in the fiscal year of 1979, and one must keep in mind that overall
aid to El Salvador in 1980 increased nearly six-fold from 1979.53
Fiscal years 1981 and 1982 continued the trend of increased assistance. In
1981, military support included $612,000 in IMET funds, a staggering $31.1 million in
MAP assistance, and $12.4 million in FMS credits. The total military aid package
consisted of $44.1 million through the three component programs, and thus
represented 22 percent of the overall aid for that year. In 1982, the military aid package
totaled over $95 million, which comprised 27 percent of the entire aid package.
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Although the percentage of military aid within the entire appropriation only increased
marginally from 1981 to 1982, the actual amount of military aid more than doubled.54
From 1980 to 1990, the United States endowed El Salvador with $996 million in
Foreign Military Financing funds and $24 million for the International Military Education
and Training Program. In addition, since 1980 the United States provided over $3 billion
in economic aid. According to the Congress Research Service, El Salvador received in
excess of four billion dollars. Over one billion of that was explicit military aid, but when
unsubsidized credits and estimated CIA investment are included, the total approached
six billion.55
In fiscal year 1990, El Salvador ranked first among Latin American recipients of
American military aid, and eighth in the world.56 Over the decade from 1980 through
1990, U.S. military assistance transformed the Salvadoran military into a larger, more
competent, armed force. This period saw the Salvadoran ranks swell from 11,000 to
45,000 men. In addition to the expansion of the military, the billions of dollars in aid
modernized and sustained weapons and equipment, and, according to U.S. military
sources, American training and tactics helped improve the quality of the Salvadoran
soldier.57
The size of the U.S. aid program increased sharply during the 1980s. In fiscal
year 1980, American aid amounted to $13.37 per capita in El Salvador; by fiscal year
1985 American aid rose to a peak of $114.65 per capita, certainly a significant boost
since the Salvadoran GNP during this same period was approximately $800 per capita.58
In fiscal 1980, Salvadoran aid accounted for 1 percent of all American foreign aid, and
increased to 3.3 by 1982.59 In terms of ranking among other American aid recipients, El
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Salvador, a country roughly the size of Massachusetts and with a population then of
around five million, was the sixteenth largest in 1980 and fifth largest in 1982.60
Undeniably, the U.S. made a tremendous investment in the Salvadoran military and
economy.
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CHAPTER 5: ESCALATION OF VIOLENCE AND AMERICAN SILENCE
Having described the Salvadoran state security apparatus including the military
and American encouragement through training and aid, the focus shifts to the actual
circumstances and events in El Salvador and the United States that eventually
culminated in the massacre at El Mozote. Trends will emerge from the following
chronology that will demonstrate American military indifference towards the loss of
civilian life. Ignoring the historical indications of an indigenous uprising against an
entrenched authoritarian state apparatus secured by violence and paternalism, the
United States resolved during the Carter and Reagan administrations to subvert
communism in Central America at any cost.
The main objective of American policy in El Salvador during the last of the
Carter years was “to bolster the [ o ernment o El Sal ador] by oursel es and ith
multilateral support.” The pro ision o military aid and trainin to El Sal ador in late
1980 sent the message that the Carter administration was willing to back the Junta at all
costs.61 General David Jones, ranking member of the Joint Chiefs, at a February 1980
meeting of the Special Coordination Committee, echoed American fears in the region.
“[I am] ery concerned that this may be too little and too late.”

e said “Next in line

after El Salvador are Honduras and Guatemala—perhaps Panama.”62 Clearly, the
implication from General Jones was that action was necessary at once.
As one of his last major foreign policy decisions on January 14, 1980, President
Carter announced $5 million in non-lethal and lethal military aid to El Salvador. The
country had received no lethal aid from the United States since 1977 due to reports of
human rights abuses. In reversal of previous policy, the Carter administration cited
evidence of Nicaraguan support for the Salvadoran rebels as a reason for
renewing aid.63
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Two weeks later, during a meeting of the National Security Council on Central
America, the CIA presented a report describing the "extraordinarily rapid growth of
guerrilla groups and their popular front organizations" in El Salvador and the role played
by Fidel Castro in helping the rebels to consolidate their strength.64 While efforts to
increase military aid to El Salvador gained credence with these reports, other dissenting
voices decried the appropriation of more funding to the regime. In a letter written on
February 19, Archbishop Oscar Romero urged President Carter to withdraw the
approximately $50 million aid package offered to El Salvador, stating that instead of
promoting peace in El Sal ador the proposal “undoubtedly [ ould] sharpen the
repression.” Romero as the best no n ad ocate o the poor in the country and his
homilies deplored government repression in all forms. In his mind, the only way the
U.S. could help El Salvador was “to condition its aid to [the] puri ication o the security
orces.” Other ise American military assistance ould “only be stren thenin those
ho oppress the people.”65 Nevertheless, later the same day the State Department
announced that it would proceed with its aid plans.66
During a March 14 meeting between Salvadoran Defense Minister Jose
Guillermo Garcia and Ambassador Robert White, Garcia admitted that 1 percent of the
Sal adoran military “mi ht concei ably be in ol ed” in human rights abuses, but he was
con inced “that the military as ninety-nine percent pure.” White pointed out that 1
percent of the Salvadoran army at that time equated to 160 men. This was official
confirmation, albeit drastically understated, that the armed forces participated in
violations of human rights. White informed Defense Minister Garcia that he could not in
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“ ood conscience” recommend that Carter provide military training teams. News of the
brutal assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero arrived only ten days later.67
On September 29, the U.S. Embassy began weekly statistical reports detailing
human rights abuses in El Sal ador called " iolence Wee in Re ie .”68 The embassy
ac no led ed the "serious limitations” on the accuracy o this and “subse uent
reports.”69 Two months later, on November 4, the United States elected Republican
candidate Ronald Reagan, to president; in El Salvador, residents of the capital's
wealthiest and most conservative neighborhoods celebrated the victory.70
Jeane Kirkpatrick and Roger Fontaine of the American Enterprise Institute and
James Theberge and Constantine Menges of the Hudson Institute, all members of the
Reagan transition team, informed members of the Salvadoran Productive Alliance (AP)
on November 28 that the Reagan administration planned to increase military aid to El
Salvador.71 This represented a major shift from the policies of the Carter administration,
which had conditioned assistance on the maintenance of respect for basic human rights.
Admittedly, one of the last actions of the Carter administration was the appropriation of
a military aid package to the government of El Salvador, but the Reagan administration
used the opportunity to argue that the previous administration was soft on
communism. Tragically, on December 2, news arrived of the abduction, rape, and
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murder of four U.S. churchwomen in El Salvador, and rumors of government
involvement further complicated an already-tense situation.72
One day later, Reagan transition team members Pedro San Juan and John
Carbaugh published a report recommending major changes in U.S. foreign policy. The
plan included making the State Department Assistant Secretary for Inter-American
Affairs responsible for coordinating policy toward the region. Calling for Ambassador
White's removal, they questioned his support for Salvadoran agrarian and banking
reforms, and criticized the human rights bureau of the State Department for allowing its
agenda to overshadow other vital U.S. concerns.73 Two days later, on December 5,
Carter suspended aid to El Salvador in response to the murder of the four American
churchwomen.74
On December 11, the "Bowdler Mission" briefed President Carter and the
members o the Special Coordinatin Committee concludin “there is a hi h probability
that an attempt was made to conceal the deaths." Salvadoran authorities knew "that
our omen ere brutally murdered” and belie ed that they ere Americans yet they
provided no information to the American Embassy. The State Department announced
on December 12 that resumption of aid to El Salvador required progress in the
investigation of the murders, government efforts to reduce political violence, initiation
of a dialogue between the government and democratic opposition leaders, and a pledge
by the junta to continue agrarian and banking reforms.75
Twelve days after suspending American aid, citing the Salvadoran government's
“commitment to a thorou h pro essional and expeditious in esti ation" o the
church omen’s murders the State Department announced the resumption of $20
million in ESF aid to stabilize the war-torn Sal adoran economy and “a oid ood
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shorta es.”76 The following day, Washington instructed Ambassador White to meet
with Duarte as soon as possible to communicate the restoration of the "full range" of
economic aid and that the U.S. ould continue to “deli er [military] e uipment in the
pipeline” that had not been subject to hold.77
On December 31, the State Department agreed with the National Security
Council and the Pentagon on the need to resume military aid to El Salvador. Excluded
from the decision-making meeting, Pat Derian, head of the State Department’s Human
Rights Bureau, wrote Secretary of State Edmund Muskie that there was "no
military exigency which requires us to resume military assistance now . . . [instead there
are] compelling reasons to maintain the suspension." She continued that the
resumption of economic aid "served to exonerate the military of responsibility for the
nuns' death" and resumed military aid "render[ed] Duarte irrelevant."78
Though official policy dictated that America publicly back the junta, internal
reports surfaced implicating the Salvadoran army as the principal violators and
instigators of many of the human rights abuses. Secretary of State Muskie
ac no led ed that iolence in El Sal ador as idespread but “there is a eneral
a reement . . . that elements o the security orces bear si ni icant responsibility.”79 A
CIA briefing paper also admitted that the Washington Post article on El Mozote
“containe[d] some elements o truth” and that o ernment orces had illed numerous
civilians there. The Salvadoran troops in Morazán numbered close to four thousand and
“numerous ci ilians” ould ha e been ictims o “both accidental” and “pre-meditated
illin s on the part o the armed orces.”80
In a speech before the American Chamber of Commerce in San Salvador,
Ambassador Deane Hinton broke with the U.S. policy of quiet diplomacy, decrying the
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failure of El Salvador's criminal justice system to deal with human rights abuses. "If you
are not convinced that I am talking about a fundamental and critical problem," he told
the audience, "consider these facts. Since 1979 perhaps as many as 30,000 Salvadorans
have been murdered, not killed in battle, murdered."81
An August 1981 paper from the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs is one of the
more striking pieces of evidence to bolster the claim that Salvadoran security forces
ere the main iolators o human ri hts. The paper described “notorious cases” o
iolence by o ernment orces a ainst “non- uerilla elements.” It explored our
different episodes of murderous excess by the Salvadoran forces, in particular, the
abduction of six leaders of the Revolutionary Democratic Front before a planned press
conference at San Jose High School in San Salvador. The perpetrators kidnapped and
murdered all six, dumping their bodies at a lake near the international airport.
According to the bureau, the bullet-ridden corpses sho ed si ns o “torture
dismemberment and stran ulation.”82
As a lo ical extension o his administration’s orld ie

upon ta in o ice

Reagan initiated a massive aid campaign to assist the government of El Salvador. His
administration viewed the situation in Central America as a political struggle between
the ree democratic West and the So iet East. One o Rea an’s main orei n policy
advisors was Jeane Kirkpatrick whose elucidation of the conflict appealed to the
president so much that he appointed her the American ambassador to the United
Nations. Kirkpatrick believed that deteriorating American influence in the region had
caused major vulnerabilities and threatened American hegemony and stability. She
openly worried about American confrontation with a ring of Soviet bases around its
southern and eastern borders.83
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From an ideolo ical standpoint Rea an as not illin to “lose” El Sal ador in
the ay Carter had “lost” Nicara ua and Rea an o ed to “dra the line” a ainst
communism in El Salvador. There was a palpable fear among those in the State
Department that failure to act decisively would signal to the Soviets a lack of American
determination. Viewed through this political prism, El Salvador became a surrogate
battleground for the test of American resolve in the region.84
Rather than risk the loss of El Salvador to leftist guerillas, Reagan resolved to
sustain the Salvadoran government with massive amounts of aid. The Reagan
administration adhered to a Cold War view of the Salvadoran conflict, seeing it not as an
indigenous conflict born of inhuman living conditions and appalling human rights abuses
but rather as a “textboo case o indirect armed a ression by Communist po ers
throu h Cuba ” as a State Department hite paper put it.85 Rea an’s irst Secretary o
State Alexander ai succinctly described the American ie : “First and oremost let
me emphasize . . . that our problem with El Salvador is external intervention in the
internal affairs of a sovereign nation in this hemisphere – nothing more, nothing less.”86
Assistant Secretary Thomas Enders urged the continuation of funding to the regime lest
“in our or i e years e’ll be i htin alon the ban s o the Panama Canal and the
Mexican border."87 The Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, Richard
Fairban s con irmed “The Duarte o ernment is bein challen ed by terrorist
insur ency supported rom the outside.”88 It was clear to everyone in the American
administration that Cuba and other communist enclaves had financed and encouraged
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the Salvadoran rebels in an attempt “to o erthro the o ernment and establish a
Marxist-Leninist state.”89
After the inauguration on January 20, 1981, the Reagan administration
removed Ambassador Robert White from his post in San Salvador after less than one
year of service. The firing of White was representative of the growing rift between
White and the ad isors in Rea an’s ne State Department.90 On March 11, in testimony
before the House Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, White stated that the
Reagan administration eliminated him because he challenged its preconceived ideas for
dealing with the Salvadoran situation through increased military aid. Referring to his
public statements on the U.S. churchwomen case, he stated, "If the price of keeping a
job is to participate in the continuing cover-up of those responsible for the barbaric act,
that price is too high for me to pay."91
As justification for increased aid expenditures, American policy-makers pressed
for proof of international communist collaboration in El Salvador. On January 14, 1981,
U.S. newspapers reported the landing of one hundred rebels of unknown origin at El
Cuco, a beach in eastern El Salvador, in thirty-foot boats. The alleged landing caused a
stir in Washington and served to bolster claims that Nicaragua, which denied launching
the boats from its territory, was arming Salvadoran rebels.92 Reagan issued a formal
presidential finding on March 9, authorizing CIA "covert activities" against Nicaragua, for
which over $19 million was allocated. CIA Director William Casey presented the finding
to Congressional intelligence committees, offering a limited outline of the plan as an
effort to interdict arms supplies from Nicaragua to the Salvadoran rebels.93
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In an attempt to associate the Salvadoran insurgency with international leftist
forces, the Reagan administration issued a contro ersial hite paper titled “Communist
Inter erence in El Sal ador.” The report presented "de initi e e idence o the
clandestine military support given by the Soviet Union, Cuba, and their communist allies
to Marxist-Leninist guerrillas now fighting to overthrow the established government of
El Salvador."94 Reporters quickly disputed the administration's interpretation of the
captured FMLN documents that provided the basis for the white paper. The State
Department admitted to "misstated detail," but stood by its conclusions. Nevertheless,
the report proved to be a public relations success.95
Another interagency paper from January 1981 described the desperate need
for aid by pointing out that in the decade from 1970 to 1979 the Salvadoran
government spent little more than 1 percent of its GNP on its armed forces. Moreover,
it had only received $8.4 million in total U.S. military aid for the decade, mostly for
trainin . Accordin to the report “[The Sal adoran Go ernment] as not prepared or
a major communist insurgency, equipped, financed and directed from outside the
country.”96
The American State Department also backed the Salvadoran government
under the pretext of the proposed reforms, and economic, agrarian and political
reforms supplied momentum and justification for American action. A February 1981
report by the State Department confirmed the American commitment to these reforms,
stating in the fiscal years o 1980 and 1981 the American o ernment “pro ided o er
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$123 million in economic assistance, primarily to help the Government of El Salvador
implement [the proposed] re orm pro rams.”97
While Washington touted the land reform proposals as signs of improvement,
some of the Salvadorans charged with implementing the reforms did not share the same
optimism. The number two official for the Salvadoran agency responsible for the
administration of the land reforms, Leonel Gomez, offered testimony in January 1981 to
a congressional subcommittee that offered a different view of the viability of the
reforms. He had fled El Salvador on January 14, ten days after the assassination of
Rodolfo Viera, the head of land reform, and after a death squad had come for him. In
his testimony, he commented on the status of the military in El Salvador and on certain
“myths” o the American State Department. When Gome and iera too o ice “[they]
found that there was no bookkeeping to speak of. We quickly discovered that ISTA (the
Institute o A rarian Trans ormation) [had] a buildin that did not exist.” 98
According to Gomez, the main reason men joined the army in El Salvador was
to et rich. Youn men entered the o icers’ corps to ac uire the po er and the spoils
of military ser ice. Unli e the “myth” pre alent in the American State Department that
the Salvadoran military was held together by an ideology of anticommunism, Gomez
contended that “[the military as] held to ether by a ast net or o corruption.” 99
Gomez rhetorically asked:
Is this the kind of government you want to support? I ask you to think about
the corruption, the bloodshed, [and] the killings that have been perpetuated
by the Salvadoran army time after time. This is the same army that once tried
to sell 10,000 machine guns to the American mafia. What more do you need
to know? How long will you have to wait until the American people rise up and
tell you what everyone already knows?100
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Representative Gerry Studds, a Massachusetts Democrat, reminded the members of the
subcommittee that the land reform program was at the center of the rationale behind
the policies of the president justifying military assistance. Studds offered an alarming
assessment: “Its director has been killed and its No. 2 person has barely escaped with
his life because he was arrested and presumably pursued directly by the military [that]
e are no armin .”101
The testimony of Gomez firmly placed blame for the strife in El Salvador at the
feet of the army. Although some in Congress, including Studds, pushed for a mediated
political solution to end the conflict, Gomez questioned the viability of politics at this
point. He said “Political solution ith hom i this army is illin anybody that dares
speak against them . . . [including] the four American missionaries that were raped and
illed by the Sal adoran Army.”102 President Duarte and the Christian Democrats “ha e
only given a façade to the military dictatorship,” and Gomez declared that Duarte
represented a “1981 [Sal adoran] ersion o

indenbur .”103

On February 25, in testimony before the House Appropriations Subcommittee
on Foreign Operations, former Ambassador White strongly opposed military aid to El
Salvador, stating that "the chief killer of Salvadorans is the government security forces"
and insisting that the aid would undermine "a fledgling government headed by civilians
who are desperately trying to bring a recalcitrant military under control."104 Regardless
o White’s reser ations on March 2, the Administration requested $25 million
in military aid and approximately $100 million in emergency economic aid to El
Salvador. Senior U.S. officials admitted in public statements and testimony that
they would not link this aid to human rights.105
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Aside from military aid, the presence of American military trainers in El
Salvador was always a perplexing facet of U.S. involvement. Although the State
Department self-imposed a fifty-man limit on American military personnel in the
country, that limit excluded certain personnel, including Marines stationed at the
embassy and members o the De ense Attaché’s o ice. The result as a con usin
situation in which few, if anyone, really knew how many American trainers worked in
the country. For example, on March 12, Department of Defense Deputy Secretary Frank
Carlucci told the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) chairman Clement Zablocki
that seventy American military personnel were in El Salvador.106 On March 21, the
Pentagon announced its plans to withdraw a third of fifty-six military advisers assigned
there, stating that it should take six months or less. Meanwhile, a State Department
"Fact Sheet" identified seventy-eight U.S. military personnel on active duty in El
Salvador.107
The Americans were aware of the position of the Salvadoran Army and knew
they ruled the country. In a surprisingly candid internal memo from March 1981 to
Secretary of State Haig, the Human Rights Bureau wrote that senior military
commanders Gutierrez, Garcia, Vides Casanova, Carranza, and Moran, not junta
President Duarte, ran the Salvadoran government. The memo claimed that these men
"control[led] the security forces" and "have resolved upon a policy of repression not
only against the guerrillas and their active sympathizers but against those who challenge
the military's pre-eminence or criticize their conduct."108 Calling the abuses the work of
a "mafia," Ambassador Deane Hinton proclaimed that "this mafia, every bit as much as
the guerrillas of Morazán and Chalatenango, are destroying El Salvador."109
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While there was a consensus within the American government toward military
funding on a massive scale to El Salvador, several members of Congress openly
questioned American intentions in the region. Gerry Studds sponsored House
Resolution 1509 aimed at endin all military assistance to the junta in El Sal ador. “The
United States is currently providing El Salvador with the largest U.S. military aid program
e ha e e er besto ed upon any nation in Latin America ” Studds rote in a letter to
ouse collea ues.

e insisted that “ . . . the basis o El Sal ador’s military problem is

political.” Rather than encoura e peace “[military undin ] has instead encoura ed
the continuation o a bitter brutal sa a e ar.” Amendments sponsored by
Representative Studds, however, failed in subcommittee on a 4-4 tie vote.110
Approving $25 million in Fiscal Year 1982 military aid to El Salvador on April 30,
the HFAC voted, 26 to 6, to require assurance that "indiscriminate torture and murder"
by security forces be controlled.111 In 1981, fully 80 percent of U.S. military aid for El
Salvador originated from a discretionary fund for military emergencies, section 506(a) of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, effectively avoiding Congressional scrutiny or
approval. Used only six times since 1961, President Reagan invoked this section twice
for El Salvador.112
Late in September, the U.S. Senate voted to require biannual presidential
certification of Salvadoran progress on human rights and political reforms. In the HFAC,
similar requirements passed and proceeded to the full House. In December, after much
haggling, the U.S. House and Senate reached a compromise requiring biannual
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presidential recertification of El Salvador's progress on human rights and political
reforms. The bill had begun its journey through Congress in early April.113 On
December 1, President Reagan issued a second presidential finding on Nicaragua,
authorizing under the National Security Act "covert activities" approved at a November
16 National Security Council (NSC) meeting. The finding informed the House and Senate
intelligence committees that the CIA would create a paramilitary force of 500 men to
interdict alleged arms traffic from Nicaragua to Salvadoran rebels and to strike alleged
Cuban military installations in Nicaragua.114
With justifications and funding in place, the stage was set for intensification of
the Sal adoran military’s counterinsur ency campai n. With American trainin
equipment, and money, the Salvadoran army formed smaller, quick-reaction battalions.
They developed these groups under explicit American encouragement, and they sought
to take the fight to the insurgents. Rather than sweeping out rebels, the battalions
quickly became symbols of the army’s unrelentin repression a ainst the eneral
population.115 In fact, the Atlacatl Battalion conducted Operation Rescue (Rescate) in
the Morazán department from December 6 to December 17, and there they carried out
the most egregious and gruesome acts of the entire war.
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CHAPTER 6: THE MASSACRE
On December 10, 1981, a two-phase, 4,000-man counterinsurgency action
executed by the Salvadoran army swept into Morazán. During the operation, the U.S.trained Atlacatl rapid-reaction battalion rounded up hundreds of residents in the town
of El Mozote, most of them women and children, and systematically slaughtered them.
Beginning with the men, followed by the women, and finally the children, the victims
were tortured and executed. The number of identified victims was over two-hundred,
and the figure is higher if one includes the unidentified remains found at the site.116
The massacre was just one of several that took place during the military's
sweep through Morazán. Other killings occurred in the nearby villages of La Joya, La
Rancheria, Los Toriles, Jocote Amarillo, and Cerro Pando.117 The Ecumenical Program on
Central America and the Caribbean, through the Commission for the Defense of Human
Rights in Central America, documented thirty-two different massacres during the civil
war by Salvadoran government forces. According to its report, the military murdered
12,000 Salvadorans in 1980 and 16,000 in 1981.118 In all instances, the Salvadoran
troops acted in the same manner: they killed everyone they came across, including men,
women, and children, and then set fire to their houses.119
El Mozote constituted the largest civilian death toll in a single episode of the
entire war.120 Nine of the eleven Salvadoran officers cited by the United Nations as
participants in the massacre trained at the U.S. Army School of the Americas at Fort
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Gulick in the Panama Canal Zone.121 In addition to soldiers from the Atlacatl Battalion,
units from the Third Infantry Brigade and the San Francisco Gotera Commando Training
Center took part in the operation.122
In the course o “Operation Rescue ” extrajudicial illin s o ci ilians too place
on December 11, with the killing of more than twenty people in La Joya canton. Again,
on December 20, over thirty people in the village of La Rancheria, and later the same
day the same Atlacatl Battalion slaughtered all of the inhabitants of Los Toriles. Finally,
on December 13, they ravaged the villages of Jocote Amarillo and Cerro Pando canton.
In sum, more than five hundred identified victims perished at El Mozote and the other
villages.123
After thirteen years of brutal civil war, both sides signed peace agreements in
Mexico in 1992. The U.N. sponsored peace accords established a Truth Commission to
hear complaints against both government and rebel soldiers accused of human rights
violations. The truth commission gathered accounts on the massacre from
eyewitnesses and other witnesses who saw the unburied bodies in the aftermath of the
disaster. It corroborated the multitude of testimonies and accounts with the 1992
exhumation o the remains. Despite public outcries and the “ease ith hich they
could be eri ied ” the Sal adoran authorities ne er ordered an in esti ation and
vehemently denied that the massacre ever took place. The victims at El Mozote were
left unburied, and during the weeks after the massacre the bodies were seen by many
people who passed by there.124
The minister o de ense and the chie o the armed orces joint sta “denied to
the Commission on the Truth that they [had] any information that would make it
possible to identi y the units and o icers ho participated” in the operation. They
claimed that there were no records for that period. Furthermore, according to the
commission, the president of the Salvadoran Supreme Court “inter ered in a biased and
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political ay” in the judicial proceedin s on the massacre instituted in 1990. 125 The
investigation of the 1981 massacre in El Mozote actually began well before the U.N.
commission when peasant farmer Pedro Chicas Romero of La Joya filed a complaint
against the Atlacatl Battalion for the massacre. Judge Federico Ernesto Portillo Campos
heard testimony in the case from Romero, Rufina Amaya Marquez, the sole survivor
of El Mozote, and others.126
The first mention of fighting in and around El Mozote appeared in a heavily
redacted cable dated December 17, 1981. The cable detailed a military operation in the
Northern Mora án Department o El Sal ador and noted that “the hea iest i htin had
occurred at El Mozote where 30 to 35 insurgents and four Salvadoran soldiers were
illed.” This cable as composed rou hly a ee a ter the massacre at El Mo ote
occurred, and ironically makes no mention of civilian causalities. It would take until
early January 1982 for the rumblings of the massacre to reach American foreign policy
personnel.127
On January 8, the American Ambassador to El Salvador, Deane Hinton,
informed the State Department about a letter he received alleging a massacre in the
Morazán area. The letter from Eugene Stockwell, a representative of the National
Council o Churches related ho reliable reports “indicate[d] that bet een December
10 and 13 a o ernment . . . operation too place in Mora án.” Stoc

ell’s letter

claimed that reports had surfaced of a military operation “ hich resulted in o er 900
ci ilian deaths.”128
Ambassador inton responded that “[ e] certainly [could not] con irm such
reports nor [did he] ha e any reason to belie e they [ ere] true.”

inton noted that

embassy sources had not mentioned anything about an alleged massacre, and he
admitted that the only source that had commented on the massacre was the
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clandestine Radio enceremos. “I do not consider Radio enceremos to be a reliable
source ” explained inton. Clearly in his estimation the story of El Mozote was a
propagandistic fabrication of the left.129
University of Arkansas physician Victor Snyder wrote a letter dated January 11,
1982, to Senator David Pryor in which he related how he had been working in a refugee
camp in Honduras where he heard stories of the massacre from families fleeing the
violence in the Morazán province. His letter asked for further information on the
matter.130 Pryor or arded the doctor’s letter to Thomas Enders alon

ith the re uest

that Enders determine the validity of the story.131
On January 27, 1982, simultaneous front-page stories appeared in the New
York Times and the Washington Post about a December 1981 massacre of hundreds of
civilians by the Atlacatl Battalion in El Mozote and neighboring towns. Although the
stories cited eyewitnesses and included graphic pictures of the scene, Salvadoran and
U.S. officials denied any massacre and characterized the stories as attempts to discredit
the Atlacatl Battalion. Both governments conceded that a confrontation did occur, but
stated that any dead were guerrilla fighters or unfortunate civilians caught in the
crossfire.132
Ironically, the next day on January 28, President Reagan certified that the
Salvadoran government was progressing on human rights, investigating the
churchwomen and Sheraton murder cases, and continuing progress toward
implementation of the land reform. This contradicted a January 26 human rights report
by the American Civil Liberties Union and Americas Watch, which estimated the murder
of 12,501 persons in 1981.133 Rea an reported that the “Go ernment o El Sal ador
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[was] making a concerted and significant effort to comply with internationally
reco ni ed human ri hts.” The ambi uity o the certi ication process lent itsel to
exaggeration by the State Department. Reagan certified the newest aid package to El
Salvador a little over a month after the massacre occurred at El Mozote.134 The
administration had a stake in the continuation of aid to the junta and this led to a
misrepresentation of the facts, which led to a preponderance of misinformation. In a
six-pa e justi ication that accompanied his determination Rea an claimed “statistics . .
. indicate a declining level of violence over the past year and a decrease in alleged
abuses by security orces.”135
A report released by Amnesty International during the same period described
the situation in El Sal ador as a “systematic and brutal policy o

o ernment-sponsored

intimidation and repression.” Amnesty International investigated many of these reports
and ound in the majority o the reported cases that “o icial security orces ha e been
implicated.”136 The administration’s assertion about declinin le els o iolence and
security orce abuses as “simply not true ” concluded Democratic Representative Tom
Harkin of Iowa.137
Upon certification of the newest round of military aid packages to the junta,
Representative Studds offered a scathing and sardonic critique of American actions.
“The President has just certi ied that up is do n and in is out and blac is hite ” he
said “and I anticipate his tellin us that ar is peace at any moment.”138 Studds
believed exerting political pressure on the junta to improve human rights was the best
approach. In his mind, the design of the certification allowed the administration the
“le era e to compel the military junta to clean up its act ” but the certi ication had told
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the junta “they can do irtually anythin ” they decided and U.S. ould “continue to
support them.”139
Representative Studds was not alone in his consternation about the
continuation of funding to the junta. The Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Charles H. Percy an Illinois Republican, personified the acerbic reception
that the certi ication recei ed in the Senate hen he said “Public con idence in the
Administration’s certi ication as sha en by the recent report . . . o alle ed massacres
rom 200 to 950 people reported in the remote illa e o Mo ote.”140 For the Senators
and Representatives who believed human rights and aid organizations like Amnesty
International and the International Red Cross, the characterization of the killings by the
administration amounted to a cover-up. Representative Michael Barnes, a democrat
from Maryland, succinctly described the frustration when he admitted that while he
ne that the Administration ould not stop undin the junta he as “concerned
about the si nals bein sent by the certi ication.” Namely “that the United States
condone[d] these abuses.”141
Representative Don Bonker from the state of Washington also weighed in on
the certi ication. “The State Department has not o ered any compellin e idence to
support its determination ” he said. No “reputable human ri hts or ani ation in the
orld supports” the State Department’s contentions and assurances continue that the
iolence o the security orces is bein controlled “but the massacres o ci ilians
continue unabated.”142
Representati e Studds openly ondered “Why it [ as] in the best interests of
[his] country to associate itself with acts of terrorism of this sort. Whose guns, whose
bullets illed those people in [El Mo ote] and San Sal ador?” Studds continued
139
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“Chances are they ere paid or by our o n taxpayers.”

e then attacked the State

Department’s notion that i le t to its o n de ices a iolent minority ould control the
country. Studds sarcastically stated “Mr. Secretary you must no that El Sal ador is
at the moment captured by a violent minority. It has been run by a violent minority for
the duration of this century, and unfortunately a violent minority supported by our own
o ernment.” I the Sal adoran army and o ernment ere told that their recent past
per ormance as acceptable “you ha e told them they can do virtually anything they
choose to do and the United States ill continue to support them.” 143
On November 30, 1983, President Reagan pocket vetoed a bill to continue the
human rights certification requirements for Salvadoran military aid.144 He suggested the
Salvadoran left might be committing some murders attributed to rightist death squads
to discredit the right and jeopardize aid. Reagan claimed that he vetoed the human
rights certification bill because it might have tempted the left or right to step up
violence to cause an aid cut-off.145
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In addition to making a mockery out of the certification process, the articles by
the New York Times and Washington Post about El Mozote had another effect. They
prompted the State Department to begin its own investigation into the massacre. The
State Department dispatched an American human rights officer and a Defense
Department attaché to the area. By the time the two were set to depart in late January
1982, the rebels had succeeded in taking back the area around El Mozote. The two
investigators flew over the area in a helicopter and interviewed people in the vicinity. 146
On January 30, 1982, U.S. Embassy officers Todd Greentree and Maj. John McKay left
San Salvador to investigate reports of a massacre in the Department of Morazán.
Although they flew over the area and interviewed refugees in a nearby town, they
decided not to visit El Mozote when their Salvadoran army escorts refused to
accompany them.147
A State Department telegram dated January 31, 1982, reported on the
investigation of the alleged massacre at El Mozote conducted by the American embassy.
The report admitted that “it [ as] not possible to pro e or dispro e excesses o iolence
against the civilian population of El Mozote by go ernment troops.” The majority of the
countryside, at the time of the investigation, was under rebel control. Furthermore, the
embassy estimated the population of El Mozote to be no more than 300 persons at the
time of the December operation.148
Although technically true, the reports that surfaced in the press and among the
refugees did not strictly confine the violence to El Mozote. The report stated that the
guerillas made no effort to remove civilians from the path of the battle, and the report
acknowledged that civilians died, but found no evidence to confirm that Salvadoran
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forces systemically massacred civilians in the operation zone.149 The rebels retook El
Mozote on December 29, 1981, killing the government troops that were there, and the
canton remained in rebel hands until the publication o the embassy’s report. It as
during this reoccupation that the rebels brought reporters into the Morazán
department.150
Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Enders testified before the House
Subcommittee on Inter-American A airs “that the human ri hts situation in El Sal ador
[ as] deeply troubled.”151 However, the State Department maintained that it was
impossible to determine who was doing the killing.152 Enders elaborated on this
ambiguity: “There are indeed incidents in hich the noncombatants ha e su ered
terribly at the hands of the guerillas, rightist vigilantes, government forces, or some or
all o them.”153 Although Enders admitted that the government of El Salvador was
involved to a certain extent, he described the tendency of the left to repeatedly
abricate and in late alle ed mass murders as a “means o propa anda.”154 In testimony
before the House Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, Enders denied that a major
massacre occurred in El Mozote in December 1981. Enders told the subcommittee, "the
town of El Mozote is now in insurgent hands. We have not been able to visit it . . .
civilians did die during the operation, but no evidence could be found to confirm a
massacre.155
On May 7, the U.S. Embassy in San Salvador cabled Washington, London,
Madrid, Mexico and Central America that it "[had] attempted to establish a database" to
determine whether civilians were massacred at El Mozote in December 1981 and had
149
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acquired voter registration lists to compare against lists of alleged victims. The Embassy
reported that it "[was] unable to reach a definite conclusion regarding civilian deaths in
El Mo ote durin the December 1981 operation.” The January 1982 Embassy
investigation concluded that civilians did die in and around El Mozote as a result of
military operations but not “as a result o systematic massacre.”156 In preparing for the
required presidential certification to Congress on El Salvador, the Embassy noted
that human rights violations continued but blamed lower-echelon military and civil
defense members and attributed the problem to poor communication with field units,
dispersed authority of the various military branches, and autonomous acts by local civil
defense units.157
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CHAPTER 7: U.N. TRUTH COMMISSION AND THE SITE EXHUMATION
Based on the testimony of over two thousand individuals testifying to twentytwo thousand human rights violations, the U.N. Truth Commission found that
government forces committed 85 percent of the violations, including El Mozote,
compared to 5 percent by the FMLN. Although the complaints did not cover every act
of violence, the commission concluded that the reports were illustrative of patterns of
violence, which involved systematic practices “attested to by thousands o
complaints.”158 The report does not dispute that state officials in El Salvador used
iolence to exercise o icial authority.

iolence ormed a “pattern o conduct ithin the

Go ernment o El Sal ador and po er elites” as a means of controlling society. Over the
past one-hundred and i ty years both "State and ci ilian roups armed by lando ners”
violently suppressed several uprisings and campesino revolts.159
A consistent pattern of violence by agents of the State and their collaborators
in El Salvador ori inated in a “political mind-set that viewed political opponents as
sub ersi es and enemies.” Anyone un ortunate enou h to express ie s that di ered
rom those o the o ernment o El Sal ador “ran the ris o bein eliminated as if they
were armed enemies on the field o battle.” Accordin to the truth commission, the
situation “ as epitomi ed by extrajudicial executions en orced disappearances and
murders o political opponents.”160
The counterinsurgency policy encouraged by the United States found its most
repressive expression in the euphemisms used by the Salvadoran forces to describe
military maneu ers. Statements li e “cuttin the uerillas li eline ” or “drainin the
rebel sea ” are e idence o the military’s inherent hostility to ards the or in poor o
El Salvador. The army automatically suspected rural inhabitants of areas where
concentrations o uerillas ere the hi hest o “belon in to the uerilla mo ement” or
“collaboratin

ith it.” Campesinos in these areas constantly ran the risk of death, and
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“El Mo ote [ as] a deplorable example o this practice

hich persisted some years.”161

In the early years of the Salvadoran civil war, violence in the countryside was
“indiscriminate in the extreme.” Roughly, three quarters of the over twenty-two
thousand reports of violence reviewed by the committee occurred during the first four
years of the war.162
The commission reported “A ind o complicity de eloped bet een
businessmen and landowners, who entered into a close relationship with the army and
intelli ence and security orces.” The purported aim o these coalitions as to rid
Salvadoran society of alleged subversives among the civilian population in order to
de end the nation “a ainst the threat o an alle ed orei n conspiracy.” In other ords
the commission concluded “ rom irtually the be innin o the century ” the
Sal adoran state security orces “throu h a misperception o its true unction

as

directed against the bulk of the ci ilian population.”163
Accordin to the report “More than 500 identi ied ictims perished at El
Mo ote and in other illa es.”164 The commission based its conclusions largely on the
findings of a group of Argentine forensic anthropologists who exhumed the bones of the
victims. The report concluded that the American-trained Atlacatl Battalion perpetrated
the attack on El Mozote and the surrounding areas.165 These two facts, not fully
accepted until after the release of the truth commission hearings, are important
because the American State Department initially disputed their veracity. According to
the report,
There is full proof that on December 11 1981, in the village of El Mozote, units
of the Atlacatl Battalion deliberately and systematically killed a group of more
than 200 men, women, and children, constituting the entire civilian population
(at least those that were in the hamlet) that they had found there the previous
day and had since been holding prisoner.166
161
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In addition, the commission concluded that there is sufficient evidence that in the days
precedin and ollo in the El Mo ote massacre troops participatin in “Operation
Rescue ” “massacred the non-combatant population of La Joya canton, and the villages
o La Rancheria Jocote Amarillo Los Toriles and in Cerro Pando canton.”167
There was full proof that General Jose Guillermo Garcia, then Minister of
Defense, initiated no investigations that might have enabled the facts to be established,
and there was sufficient indication that General Rafael Florez Lima, Chief of the Armed
Forces Joint staff at the time, was aware that the massacre had occurred and failed to
undertake any investigation. The high command of the Salvadoran military also took no
steps hatsoe er to pre ent the repetition o such acts “ ith the result that the same
units ere used in other operations and ollo ed the same procedures.”168
As part of the accords, the truth commission exhumed and examined the
massacre site using professional excavation teams. The exhumation began in October
1992, carried out by experts in forensic anthropology from Argentina. Within several
days, they unearthed twenty-five skulls from the ruins of the town's church. By the time
the team finished its work in November, it had identified the remains of one hundred
and forty-three people, and all but twelve were children.169
The excavation of the small convent building adjacent to the church at El
Mozote took place from November 13 to 17, 1992. The team of forensic
anthropologists completed the first examination of the material unearthed during the
excavation, and the laboratories of both the Santa Tecla Institute of Forensic Medicine
and the Commission for the Investigation of Criminal Acts carried out subsequent
examinations. The exhumation and examination teams were able to make numerous
conclusions about the massacre based on the physical remains.170
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The depositing of all the skeletal material occurred during the same event and
some critics of the massacre argued that the convent was a clandestine cemetery. This
finding excluded that possibility. In addition, the events happened during, or prior to,
1981. Of the coins and cartridge cases located at the site, their dates of manufacture
were no later than 1981. In the convent, examiners found the skeletal remains of 143
persons, but laboratory analysis indicated that there might have been a greater number.
The extensive fragmentation of body parts and the total cremation of very young infants
could account for many more victims.171
The skeletal remains found showed signs of damage caused by crushing and
fire, and the majority of the victims were minors. Of the 143 bodies identified, 131 were
children under the age of twelve, five were adolescents, and seven were adults, and one
of the victims was a pregnant woman. Examiners noticed large quantities of bullet
fragments inside the convent. They observed that virtually all of the ballistic evidence
was in direct contact with or imbedded in the bone remains, clothing, household goods,
and the floor. In addition, spatial distribution of the bullet fragments coincided with the
area of greatest concentrations of skeletal matter.172
Of the identified skeletal remains, examiners were able to associate sixty-seven
with bullet fragments. They detected fragments in the areas of the skull and thorax in
forty-seven victims. The arrangement and wounds on the bodies suggested that they
were lying facedown on the ground as they died. This was a blow to the argument that
the children were enemy combatants, actively resisting the government forces. There
as no e idence that the ictims had been in ol ed in combat: “Rather the e idence
strongly support[ed] the conclusion that they were intentional victims of a mass extrajudicial execution.”173
The forensic team conducted firearms analysis on the material recovered at
the Medical Legal Institute at Santa Tecla. A 5.56 mm NATO-caliber firearm fired all but
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one of the cartridges found, the lone exception being a 7.62 mm NATO case, possibly
fired from an American M-14. By examining the firing pin imprint, extractor marks and
location, and bolt face marks, the investigators determined that the cases originated
from American M-16s.174 The team removed ammunition from the bodies of the
victims, the same ammunition provided to the Atlacatl Battalion by their American
trainers. The ballistics analyst recovered 245 cartridges of which 184 had discernable
headstamps labeled “L. C. ” identi yin the ammunition as ha in been manu actured
for the United States Government at Lake City ordnance plant near Independence,
Missouri.175
The evidence indicated that at least twenty-four people took part in the
shooting. At least eleven fired in the interior of the building, and of those, at least two
fired on the interior and exterior of the building. Given the large number of individuals
and the small size of the structure, the examiners postulated that small groups of
perpetrators brought the victims to the location in turn.176 There was no formal
execution-style squad, rather a much larger group of persons responsible for the
shootin s. The orensic experts concluded that the e idence “con irm[ed] the alle ation
o a mass murder” and implicated units of the Atlacatl Battalion in the deliberate and
systematic illin o “a roup o more than 200 men

omen and children constitutin

the entire ci ilian population [o El Mo ote].”177
Following the publication of the findings from the truth commission, on July
15, 1993, a panel appointed by Secretary of State Warren Christopher released its
report evaluating the State Department's conduct during the civil war in El Salvador. In
particular, the panel, headed by retired Foreign Service officers George Vest and Richard
174
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Murphy, examined whether political considerations influenced the U.S. embassy
in El Salvador's human rights reporting. The report concluded that "mistakes were
made," particularly in the handling and investigation of the 1981 El Mozote massacre,
but generally praised the performance of the department. Embassy and State
Department officials, wrote the panel, "devoted an extraordinary amount of attention
to human rights cases" and "pursued [them] aggressively."178
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION
Professor and journalist Mark Danner called the massacre at El Mozote a
“parable o the Cold-War ” ith the U.S. torn bet een t o mutually exclusi e
objectives. On the one hand, the American government publicly proclaimed that it
valued and respected human rights, but on the other, it wanted to prevent a communist
takeover in El Salvador. After reading the correspondence of ambassadors and
department heads, it is clear that the main goal of American foreign policy in the region
was the expulsion of communism. Unfortunately, because of the fixation on subverting
communist influences, policy makers minimized human rights.
The massacre at El Mozote was the direct result of a joint U.S.-Salvadoran push
to expel rebels from the northern Morazán district. The Americans supplied the training
and ammunition, while the Atlacatl Battalion and the Salvadoran military supplied the
repression. They stormed into El Mozote around December 9, summarily executed all of
the inhabitants including women and children, and left the village a charred mass of
rubble two days later.
Rather than reprimanding the commanding officers, American advisors praised
commanders like Domingo Monterossa, the infamous leader of the Atlacatl Battalion. In
fact, four American lieutenant colonels in a 1988 report on American military
per ormance in El Sal ador stated “The Sal adoran Army produced a number o
exceptional combat leaders – men li e Domin o Monterossa.” 179 To be sure, extrajudicial massacre and rampant corruption were tools in the counterinsurgency arsenal,
and the sheer number of incidents proved that this was policy, and not the workings of
a repressive fringe.
It would not be until January 27, 1982, that word would come to the world
from the reports of Raymond Bonner and Alma Guillermoprieto. The subsequent
intelligence from the American embassy and State Department, while conceding that
they had no real proof either way, placed doubt on the veracity of the massacre reports.
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The State Department assertion that there were fewer than three hundred persons in
Mozote was a spurious misinterpretation of the facts. The newspaper reports from
Bonner and Guillermoprieto, and the letters from Eugene Stockwell and Victor Snyder
all referred to El Mozote and the area around it, not simply El Mozote. The operation
lasted for nearly three weeks and the massacre at El Mozote was but the largest of
several.180 This reductionist view from the State Department was an attempt to
discredit the stories within the press, and the letters from other observers. The area
had a large refugee population and the opposite was the case; the amount of persons
within El Mozote was higher than normal due to regional displacement because of the
war.
In addition, American foreign policy personnel conducted only a token
investigation to verify the claims of myriad journalists and relief agencies, but even this
was more than the Salvadorans who never considered an investigation. Only after the
exertion of public pressure because of the New York Times and Washington Post articles
did the State Department mount its investigation. American ambassador to El Salvador,
Deane Hinton, sent political officer Todd Greentree and military attaché Major John
McKay to investigate the stories of the massacre. Since the area was once again under
rebel control, the two men did not even visit El Mozote. They simply flew over the area
in a helicopter.
Once on the ground, the investigators interviewed residents from the
surrounding areas, but they conducted most of the interviews in the presence of
Salvadoran soldiers. As we have seen, the military had little tolerance for criticism and it
would be naïve to think that the refugees felt the freedom to discuss the events openly.
Thus, it is not surprising that the report found no evidence of a government sponsored
massacre in the region and concluded that most of the inhabitants of El Mozote were at
least passive members of the rebel resistance. It would take eleven years of war and a
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group of forensic anthropologists to prove this conclusion wrong.181 American fear of
the ideological encroachment of communism forced its foreign policy leaders to back a
government and military that denied basic human rights to the inhabitants of El
Salvador. The military problem in El Salvador was a political one, a problem exacerbated
by the appropriation of huge foreign subsidies from the U.S.
The residue of American involvement in El Salvador is visible today. Besides
the huge craters made by American bombs that scar much of the eastern half of the
country, the small plaque that resides inside the town square of El Mozote is a
testament to American foreign policy initiatives. Innocent men, women and children
made little difference; the U.S. was determined to support a corrupt, murderous regime
because it represented the only viable alternative to communism. Collateral damage
was just that, and as long as it prevented the formation of another Cuba or Nicaragua,
the U.S. would endure the consequences.
It seems unreasonable to martyr innocent Salvadorans to a reactionary regime
simply to establish American regional hegemony, and according to scholar Enrique
Baloyra, those who claim otherwise are making the same racist, patronizing, and
imperialist argument of those formerly in the American State department.182
Supporting the appropriation of military aid to a government based around the
repression of its own people is to support such repression of human rights, and any
government sustained principally by threats of violence is counter to the American
system.183
Even though much of the evidence for American sanctioning of violence is
circumstantial, the collected amount is compelling. The exponential growth in American
funding to the regime after El Mozote provided the means and material that the regime
required to oppress the people, and carry out massacres like Mozote. Without
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American assistance, the regime would have withered by the mid-1980s; the main
achievement of American intervention was the extension of the war. The American
stance against communism provided a reasonable rationale for intervention, and the
Salvadoran military, which cooperated for monetary gain, created a horrible situation
for the majority of Salvadorans. The mountain of evidence from multiple sources on
corruption, ineptitude, and a blatant disregard for human rights from both the
Salvadoran military and American policy makes it clear that humanitarian concern was
near the bottom of the list.
At a certain point, the lack of initiative in preventing the violence becomes a
tacit sanctioning of the violence. U.S. policies and actions were incongruent, and in the
case of El Mozote, they were in direct opposition. While American politicians scolded
other countries for perceived shortcomings in human rights, the American
administration was abhorrently funding what some considered genocide in El
Salvador.184 American foreign policy showed little concern with the spread of
democracy, and even less towards the respect of human rights. The main concern was
the subversion of communism, and for that goal, the U.S. government was willing to
tolerate the indiscriminate murder of innocent civilians.
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